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DRUG TESTING IN THE NONUNIONIZED
WORKPLACE: SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, AND
MAINE'S DRUG-TESTING STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
As former President Reagan stated in Executive Order No. 12,564,
"[d]rug use is having serious adverse effects upon a significant pro-
portion of the national work force .... "I One survey by the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse found that between ten and twenty-
three percent of all employees use drugs at work.2 The Institute has
also reported that twenty million Americans use marijuana and four
million use cocaine.3 In addition, ninety percent of those using co-
caine do so during work hours, and approximately half of those
users buy and sell cocaine at work.'
The costs to industry in lost productivity due to drugs are equally
staggering. Employee drug and alcohol abuse resulted in an esti-
mated $100 billion in lost productivity in 1986.1 Furthermore, em-
ployees with drug or alcohol abuse problems have an absentee rate
sixteen times greater than the average employee, and an accident
rate which is four times greater.6 Even when impaired workers are
not absent from work, their work potential is only sixty-seven per-
cent of the work potential of unimpaired workers. 7
To combat the drug problem, former President Reagan issued Ex-
ecutive Order 12,564 calling for a "drug-free federal workplace."'
This order authorized the implementation of drug testing in the
public sector. The private sector, however, has also responded to the
nation's drug problem. Fifty percent of the Fortune 500 companies
1. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.FT.R 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1988).
2. Comment, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector Employees,
65 N.C.L. REv. 832 (1987) (citation omitted).
3. Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MI&AM L Rnv. 553, 558
(1988) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Survey].
4. Comment, supra note 2.
5. Id. But see Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of
Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 48 U. Prrr. L Rnv. 201, 203 ("It is estimated that employee drug use costs the
nation $33 billion per year in lost productivity and accident-related costs, and in
other, lesser respects including increased health care costs, shoddy workmanghip and
employee theft.") (citing Nat'l L.J. Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col 2).
6. Miller, supra note 5, at 203-204 (citation omitted).
7. Survey, supra note 3, at 558 (citation omitted).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,564, C.F.R 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 app. at
133-35.
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conduct drug testing,9 and as the problem grows, more companies,
both large and small, can be expected to follow.
Society should encourage both public and private employers to
implement drug-testing programs. Such programs can be used to de-
tect employees with drug abuse problems, thus avoiding the poten-
tial threat that such employees pose to themselves, their coworkers,
and the public at large. Furthermore, if drug abuse on the job can be
reduced, employee productivity will be strengthened. 10 Any drug-
testing policy, however, should seek to balance the interests of em-
ployers in having a safe workplace and maximum productivity and
the interests of employees in protecting their individual rights.
Those opposing the implementation of drug testing in the work-
place have raised a number of constitutional challenges." This Com-
ment focuses specifically on the fourth amendment and the proce-
dural due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
as they are implicated in drug-testing programs." After briefly out-
lining the limitations to these constitutional challenges, the Com-
ment provides a general overview of the fourth amendment. It then
specifically discusses the fourth amendment and how it applies to
drug testing in the nonunionized workplace.18 The Comment also
provides a general overview of the procedural due process provisions
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, followed by a discussion of
how these provisions relate to nonunionized employee drug testing.
It then analyzes, compares, and contrasts Maine's drug-testing stat-
ute with the standards and procedures for drug testing established
by courts faced with fourth amendment and procedural due process
9. Survey, supra note 3, at 561 (citation omitted).
10. Drug-testing programs should also provide employees with the help they need
so that they can return to the workforce when they are ready. In this way, the pro-
grams can recognize the problem and be a part of the solution.
11. The most frequent constitutional challenges to drug testing include the claim
that it violates the right against unlawful searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment, the right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment, the pen-
umbral right to privacy under the fourteenth amendment, and the right to substan-
tive and procedural due process.
12. The Comment analyzes the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the federal
Constitution and not the state constitutions. As Justice Brennan stated, "I believe
that the Fourteenth Amendment fully applied the provisions of the Federal Bill of
Rights to the states, thereby creating a federal floor of protection and that the Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment allow diversity only above and beyond this
federal constitutional floor." Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival
of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 535, 5650
(1986).
13. The employers' power to test unionized workers for drug use may be limited
by collective bargaining agreements and the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (1982)). This Comment only addresses unionized workers to the extent that
they make constitutional challenges to drug-testing programs. It does not seek to dis-




challenges to drug-testing programs. A comparison will also be made
between the Maine statute and the drug-testing statutes of other
states.
The Comment concludes that the recently enacted Maine drug-
testing statute is a step in the right direction because it seeks to
balance the interests of employers with those of employees. The
statute, however, falls short of its goal. Although the requirements
for applicant drug testing and for random drug testing under limited
circumstances represent an appropriate balancing of interests, the
probable cause standard for employee drug testing and the cursory
treatment of the procedural due process rights of employees are in
need of revision. A balancing of interests between employers and the
public on one hand and between employers and employees on the
other suggests that a less stringent standard than probable cause is
required. Furthermore, if employees are given the opportunity to
appeal and contest the accuracy of test results, the statute should
provide minimum requirements for procedural due process. Since
the Maine drug-testing statute seeks to extend the constitutional
protections enjoyed by public employees to private employees, the
statute should more closely reflect the standards and procedures es-
tablished by courts faced with federal constitutional challenges to
drug-testing programs.
IL THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The Constitution places affirmative obligations on federal, state,
and local governmental employers. 1 4 The rights of private employees
in the workplace are protected by neither federal nor state constitu-
tions.1 5 As stated in United States v. Lamar,'0 "if a search is con-
ducted . . . for purely private reasons, it does not fall within the
protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment."' 7 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer 8 held that "the action inhibited
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such ac-
tion as may be fairly said to be that of the States. That Amendment
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discrimina-
tory or wrongful."' 9 Therefore, the discussion in this Comment of
the fourth amendment's search and seizure provisions and the fifth
and fourteenth amendments' procedural due process provisions gen-
14. Survey, supra note 3, at 567 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US. 3, 13
(1883)).
15. Development in the Law-The Constitutional Issues of Drug Testing in the
Workplace, 23 WmL s-rra L REv. 553, 554 (1987) [hereinafter Development in the
Law].
16. 545 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1977).
17. Id. at 490.
18. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19. Id. at 13.
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erally applies only to governmental employees.
If, however, "a sufficient nexus exists between the actions of the
private employer and a governmental entity, '20 the constitutional
limitations will apply. The determination of whether or not there is
a sufficient nexus depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.21 There are, however, three theories upon which a sufficient
nexus may be established: the government function theory, the en-
tanglement theory, and the coercive state action theory.2 2
The government function theory is best illustrated in Evans v.
Newton.23 There, a United States Senator executed a will that de-
vised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, a
tract of land which was to be used as a park by members of the
white race only. The city enforced the policy of segregation for a
number of years, but then began allowing blacks to use the park. A
Georgia state court accepted the resignation of the city as trustee
and appointed three new individuals (who would enforce the policy
of segregation). 24 Although this judgment was upheld by the Georgia
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. It
held that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the
State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitu-
tional limitations." 5
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,26 the Supreme Court
applied the entanglement theory in finding that a restaurant oper-
ated by a private owner under lease in a building financed by public
funds was an agency of the state of Delaware. Thus, when the res-
taurant excluded a black person, solely on account of race, it was
subject to constitutional limitations.2 The Court held that state re-
sponsibility necessarily followed upon "state participation through
any arrangement, management, funds or property."28
In contrast to the Burton case, the Supreme Court in Blum v.
Yaretsky" applied the coercive state action theory. It held that
medicaid recipients who sought to challenge their transfers to other
20. Survey, supra note 3, at 567.
21. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("Only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."); Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) ("The true nature of the State's in-
volvement may not be immediately obvious, and detailed inquiry may be required
22. Survey, supra note 3, at 568.
23. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
24. Id. at 297-98.
25. Id. at 299.
26. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
27. Id. at 726.
28. Id. at 722 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
29. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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facilities on the grounds that there was a lack of notice under the
fourteenth amendment failed to establish state action in the deci-
sions of the nursing home.30 The Court found that "a state normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provided such significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed
to be that of the State." 31 In sum, the state must have "compelled
the act."3' 2
If employees in the private sector can show that the tests of any of
these three theories are met, then the constitutional protections of
the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments will be available to
challenge a drug-testing policy. If, on the other hand, employees are
unable to establish such a theory, their only recourse will be to state
law, and, in very limited circumstances, to state constitutions.3
IL THE FOURTH AhENDhma. AN OVERVIEW
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.-'
Before one can launch into an inquiry of whether or not there has
been a violation of the fourth amendment when a search is con-
ducted, one must first determine whether the individual is entitled
to the protection of the amendment. In order to make this determi-
nation, the court must decide whether there was a "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" when the search was carried out.30 In Katz v.
United States,8 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion explains the
Court's two-fold requirements for finding an expectation of privacy.
First, the person must have an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy. Second, this expectation must be one that society is pre-
30. Id. at 1012.
31. Id. at 1004. See also Development in the Law, supra note 15, at 555 ('There-
fore, if an employee can show that the state, in any substantial way, actively encour-
ages or commands the deprivation of the employee's constitutional rights, the private
employee may argue deprivation of individual rights based on the (coercive] state
action doctrine.").
32. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (quoting Adiches v. SI.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).
33. See infra notes 181-281 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
35. Miller, supra note 5, at 213.
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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pared to recognize as reasonable.3 7
In applying this test, it is important to note that not all individu-
als have the same expectation of privacy. As a result, not all enjoy
the same degree of fourth amendment protection. 8 There are, for
example, significant differences in the rights of military and non-
military personnel.39
Once the expectation of privacy has been established, the fourth
amendment applies. Thereafter, a governmental intrusion of suffi-
cient magnitude is deemed a search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. In United States v. Jacobsen,0 the Su-
preme Court stated that "[a] 'search' occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in-
fringed." 42 Furthermore, "[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory in-
terests in that property.' 42
The final step in the fourth amendment analysis is for the court to
decide whether a search meets the fourth amendment's "ultimate
dictate of reasonableness."'4 The test of reasonableness requires a
balancing of interests between the governmental need for a particu-
lar search and the "invasion of personal rights that the search en-
tails."' 44 Factors to be considered include the scope of the search, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for its initiation,
and the place the search occurs. 45
Traditionally, for a reasonable search, courts have required that a
warrant be issued upon probable cause.' 6 Courts, however, have dis-
pensed with the warrant requirement when "it is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search."'4 Similarly, probable
cause is not an "indispensable component" of reasonableness in
every case.48 If probable cause is not required, some less stringent
37. Id. at 361. At least one commentator has concluded that the two-fold require-
ment of Katz has been superseded in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). See
Miller, supra note 5, at 213 & n.50. In Hudson, the Supreme Court applied only the
objective factor of the two-fold requirement, disregarding the individual's subjective
expectation of privacy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 525.
38. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1007-1008 (D.C. 1985).
39. Development in the Law, supra note 14, at 557.
40. 446 U.S. 109 (1984).
41. Id. at 113 (citation omitted). See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
716 (1983).
42. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
43. Miller, supra note 5, at 213.
44. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
45. Id.
46. See supra note 34.
47. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967); Miller, supra note 5, at
215. Warrants are also dispensed with when a valid arrest is made pursuant to exi-
gent circumstances. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
48. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390
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standard, such as individualized suspicion, can be used.
IL DRUG TESTING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT' 0
A. Drug Testing as a Search
One of the most frequently raised constitutional challenges to
drug testing in the nonunionized workplace is that it constitutes a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Schmerber v. California" was one of the first cases to explore the
fourth amendment protection against bodily intrusions. The peti-
tioner, Schmerber, was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court
for driving under the influence of alcohol-a criminal offense. He
was arrested at a hospital after being involved in an automobile ac-
cident, and police directed that a blood sample be withdrawn by a
physician. The sample showed that the petitioner was intoxicated,
and this evidence was used to convict him. The petitioner appealed
his conviction upon a number of different grounds, one of which in-
cluded a violation of his fourth amendment rights. 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan clearly stated that "[ilt
could not reasonably be argued... that the administration of the
blood test. . . was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'per-
sons'... within the meaning of that Amendment." 2 After assuring
that the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court concluded that the search was reasonable because a "clear
likelihood" that the evidence would be found existed.53 Further-
(1989).
49. Although blood and breath tests are available to employers who test employ-
ees for drugs, the preferred method of drug testing is urinalysis. Survey, supra note 3,
at 559 n.23 (citation omitted). The most popular method of urinalysis is enzyme mul-
tiplied immunoassay technique (EMIT). This method is inexpensive, has a short
analysis time, and can detect a wide range of drugs. Id. at 563. The scientific princi-
ples behind the test, however, are quite complicated. A reagent is produced by com-
bining an antibody with an antigen, which serves as an indicator. The antibody and
the indicator undergo a chemical reaction in which the indicator binds to the an-
tibody. After the reagent is created, urine is introduced into the mixture. If a drug
metabolite is present in the urine, the metusoite will displace the indicator and bind
to the antibody. Id. at 563 n.45 (quoting Bible, Screening Workers for Drugs: The
Constitutional Implications of Urine Testing in Public Employment, 24 AL Bus.
LJ., 309, 311-12 (1986)).
Because the EMIT test has the disadvantage of being error prone and producing
"false positives," it is generally used for preliminary screenings only. Id. at 563-64.
Thus, it should be followed by the analytical method that experts find the most accu-
rate: gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MIS). Id. at 565. This test uses a
mass spectrum technique producing a pattern unique to each drug. Id. at 565 n.55
(citation omitted).
50. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
51. Id. at 759.
52. Id. at 767.
53. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text-
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more, no warrant was necessary because of the exigency of the
situation."
When the issue of whether urinalysis constituted a search and
seizure was raised, courts relied upon Schmerber to support the con-
clusion that such testing fell within the ambits of the fourth amend-
ment. In Capua v. City of Plainfield,5 city fire fighters brought an
action challenging mass urine testing for drug abuse on the grounds
that it violated the fourth amendment.58 The district court, in
reaching the conclusion that such testing did constitute a search and
seizure, first addressed the individual's expectation of privacy. It
stated that "[o]ne's anatomy is draped with constitutional protec-
tion. '57 As a result, "[c]ourts have clearly established that individu-
als retain an expectation of privacy and a right to be free from gov-
ernment intrusion in the integrity of their own bodies."' 8
Furthermore, each individual "has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the personal 'information' bodily fluids contain."' 9 For these
reasons, the governmental taking of urine was deemed the
equivalent of withdrawing blood in Schmerber60 As such, it consti-
tuted a search and seizure.8 '
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,2 railway la-
bor organizations sought to enjoin the Federal Railroad Administra-
tion's drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees.65 The Supreme
Court, like the district court in Capua, addressed the issue of
whether drug testing constituted a search and seizure. The Court
found that chemical analysis of urine can reveal a number of private
medical facts, such as whether an individual is epileptic, pregnant,
54. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 770-71. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (A surgical operation to remove a bullet from a robbery suspect was an unrea-
sonable search and seizure.).
55. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
56. Id. at 1512.
57. Id. at 1513 (quoting United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir.
1978)).
58. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
59. Id. See also Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1435 (N.D. I1. 1987) ("[A]n
employee must be deemed to have a fairly strong expectation of privacy in the act of
urination and in the urine itself."). But see Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500
A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring) ("An individual cannot retain a
privacy interest in a waste product that, once released, is flushed down the drain.").
60. It is true, however, that although urine testing is the constitutional equivalent
of blood testing, it is not a direct parallel. Blood testing involves a forced penetration
of the body tissues, while urine testing involves a forced extraction of body fluids.
61. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. at 1435 ("The very purpose of the urine
testing program ... is to make sure an employee's urine is seized .... ).
62. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Although Skinner dealt with a labor organization, the
challenges to the drug-testing program raised constitutional issues. Therefore, the
case is relevant for the purposes of this Comment. See infra notes 93 & 106.
63. Id. at 1410.
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or diabetic." Such testing, therefore, implicated individual privacy
interests. 5
In taking the analysis one step further, however, the Court held
that "the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations
of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable. . . ."0 In
fact, "[t]here are few activities in our society more personal or pri-
vate than the passing of urine.11
7
B. The Reasonableness of Drug Testing
1. The Warrant
The application of the fourth amendment to a particular situation
only begins the analysis into the standards governing searches and
seizures.6 8 The standards governing the reasonableness of drug test-
ing as a search and seizure are also instrumental to the inquiry. As
discussed earlier,69 a search ordinarily must be carried out pursuant
to a warrant. This requirement, however, can be dispensed with
when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search."70 The issue, therefore, is
whether drug testing justifies dispensing with the warrant
requirement.
In Allen v. City of Marietta,71 the plaintiffs, all governmental em-
ployees of the Marietta Board of Lights and Water or of the City of
Marietta, worked around high voltage power lines. Each was sus-
pected of smoking marijuana on the job. They were given the oppor-
tunity to resign, but none of them did so. As a result, each plaintiff
was advised that he would be fired unless he submitted to urine
testing. All of the plaintiffs elected to take the test. The test results
were all positive, and each employee was eventually dismissed. The
plaintiffs filed suit claiming, among other things, a deprivation of
their fourth amendment rights.7
2
The district court, after noting that the urine tests were adminis-
tered without obtaining a warrant, stated that "[o]ne of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement which appears to have emerged is
a class of cases involving searches of government employees."" The
cases involved a balancing of the individuals' expectation of privacy
64. Id. at 1413.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170,
175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)).
68. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
69. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
70. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
71. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
72. Id. at 484-85.
73. Id. at 489 and cases cited therein.
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against the government's right, as an employer, to investigate em-
ployee misconduct when it was directly related to the employees'
performance of their duties.7 4 Although the governmental employees
did not surrender their fourth amendment rights simply because
they worked for the government, the government's right to discover
and prevent employee misconduct was such that the employees
could not really claim an expectation of privacy from these
searches.7 5 Thus the city had "a right to make warrantless searches
of its employees for the purpose of determining whether they
[were] using or abusing drugs which would affect their ability to
perform safely their work with hazardous materials.'76
Whether the district court in Allen would have decided the case
in the same way if the employees did not work with hazardous
materials is a matter of speculation. Arguably, the government's
need to prevent drug abuse would not have been as great if the jobs
had not dealt with hazardous materials, since the risk of serious ac-
cidents on the job would not have been as likely. By contrast, when
employees work with hazardous materials, there is a greater risk of
harm to employees and the public. Thus the need to prevent drug
abuse is greater when the working conditions are dangerous.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,7 7 however, sug-
gests that working with hazardous materials is not central to the
question.78 In Skinner, the Supreme Court stated that "[a]n essen-
tial purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests
by assuring" that searches "are not the random or arbitrary acts of
government agents." 79 Furthermore, a warrant provides "the de-
tached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate" who makes certain that the
intrusion is necessary.80 Since the urine testing procedures were
"narrowly and specifically" defined by the Federal Railroad Admin-
istration and "standardized" in nature,81 there was no need for a
74. Id.
75. Id. at 491.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). For a synopsis of the facts of Skinner, see supra note
63 and accompanying text.
78. Skinner involved "hazardous materials" to the extent that a locomotive can
become a lethal weapon when used inappropriately. Although working with hazardous
materials is not central to the issue of the warrant requirement, it bears heavily on
the issue of whether or not individualized suspicion is required. See infra notes 98-
117 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 1415.
80. Id.
81. Id. The drug tests were administered upon the occurrence of specified events,
such as after a major train accident. They also could have been administered after
any reportable accident if the employee's supervisor had "reasonable suspicion" that
the employee's acts contributed to the accident. In addition, tests could have been




neutral magistrate to evaluate the situation. In addition, one of the
purposes of the drug-testing program was to measure whether drugs
were in the bloodstream when a specified event (e.g. an accident)
occurred. The warrant requirement was likely to frustrate this pur-
pose because during the time it would take to obtain a warrant,
drugs and alcohol would be eliminated from the bloodstream at a
constant rate. Thus, under the circumstances in Skinner, the Court
found that a warrant was unnecessary.82
This, however, is not to say that warrants are never required in
order to establish the reasonableness of a drug-testing search.
Whether or not a search is reasonable depends upon "the context
within which [the] search takes place." 83 A case-by-case analysis is,
therefore, required. If, however, the tests are specifically defined and
standardized, and if the warrant requirement is likely to frustrate
the effectiveness of testing, Skinner suggests that no warrant is
necessary.
2. Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and Random Testing
Even if a warrant is not necessary in a particular case, the search
normally must be based upon "'probable cause' to believe that a
violation of the law has occurred. 8 4 Probable cause, however, is not
an "irreducible requirement of a valid search."8 5 When a balancing
of the governmental and individual interests suggests that the pub-
lic interest will best be served by a standard of reasonableness that
falls short of probable cause, the Supreme Court has "not hesitated
to adopt such a standard." '
Drug testing is one example of a search and seizure that can be
conducted pursuant to a less stringent standard than probable
cause. In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,7 fire fighters brought ac-
82. Id. at 1415-16.
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
84. Id. at 340. According to BLAcK's LAW DIcnoNARY,
[Probable cause refers to] [r]easonable grounds for belief that a person
should be... searched. Probable cause exists where the facts and circum-
stances would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense was or is being committed.
Probable cause for search and seizure with or without search warrant in-
volves probabilities which are not technical but factual and practical con-
siderations of every day life upon which reasonable and prudent men act,
and essence of probable cause is reasonable ground for belief of guilt.
BLAcK's LAw DiCTIoNARY 1081 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Commonwealth v. Stewart, 358
Mass. 747, 267 N.E.2d 213 (1971); Paula v. State, 188 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fi. App.
1966)).
85. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
86. Id. at 341. For a general discussion of probable cause see supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text.
87. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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tion against the city, the city board of commissioners, and the fire
chief asking that urine tests be enjoined and that declaratory judg-
ment be entered finding the proposed tests unconstitutional. The
plaintiffs claimed relief under various amendments to the Constitu-
tion, including the fourth amendment.88 The court, in considering
the reasonableness of the drug-testing search, held that although the
fire fighters did not surrender their subjective expectations of pri-
vacy when they became city employees, the community could de-
mand that they give up some part of their privacy interests to ad-
vance the community's interests.8 9 Thus, while probable cause would
not be required to conduct the tests, the balancing of the city's in-
terest with that of the fire fighters' required "some quantum of indi-
vidualized suspicion" before the tests could be administered. This
quantum of suspicion was referred to as "reasonable suspicion."0
Reasonable suspicion usually requires that there be "some articul-
able basis for suspecting that the employee [is] using illegal
drugs."' Since the city was unable to point to any objective facts,
such as deficient job performance, to support the drug testing pro-
gram, the standard of reasonable suspicion was deemed unsatisfied,
and the testing procedure was held to be unconstitutional.2
Similarly, the defendants' drug-testing program in Patchogue-
Medford Congresi of Teachers v. Board of Education5 was found
unconstitutional because tests were conducted without reasonable
suspicion. All probationary teachers of the Patchogue-Medford
School District were required to submit to a urinalysis examination
even though there was no indication of drug use."' The court of ap-
88. Id. at 876-77.
89. Id. at 880.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 881. See also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) ("[S]ufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. . . ."); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C.
1985) (The standard of "suspected" drug use does not grant the governmental em-
ployer "carte blanche to order testing on a purely subjective basis."). The terms "in-
dividualized suspicion" and "reasonable suspicion" are used interchangeably. It is im-
portant to note that "reasonable suspicion" is not the same as "reasonable grounds"
to believe an infringement is taking place. "Reasonable suspicion" is based on some
articulable basis rather than on hard and fast grounds for belief. For example, defi-
cient job performance will constitute "reasonable suspicion," but something like the
smell of alcohol on the employee's breath or the signs commonly associated with drug
abuse will constitute "reasonable grounds" for drug testing.
92. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. at 882.
93. 510 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1987). Although Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teach-
ers dealt with a teachers' union, the union's claim was constitutional in nature. The
National Labor Relations Act and collective bargaining agreements were not impli-
cated. This case is, therefore, relevant for the purposes of this Comment. See supra
note 61. See infra note 106.
94. Id. at 326. Drug testing conducted in the absence of individualized suspicion is
commonly referred to as "random drug testing."
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peals noted that the purpose behind having reasonable searches was
to protect the public's interest in maintaining the privacy, dignity,
and security of its members.95 Thus random searches conducted
without reasonable suspicion were to be closely scrutinized, and only
permitted "when the privacy interests implicated [were] minimal,
the government's interest [was] substantial, and safeguards [were]
provided to insure that the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy [was] not subjected to unregulated discretion. '*0 Since or-
dering a person to produce urine for inspection was no less offensive
than requiring the individual to empty his pockets and produce a
report containing the results of the urine tests, the privacy interests
of the teachers were not minimal. " Thus, having failed to comply
with one of the necessary factors indicated above, the Board of Edu-
cation violated the teachers' rights, and the tests were prohibited.
3. Closely Regulated Industries
Although random drug testing is difficult to achieve constitution-
ally, under the factors outlined in Patchogue-Medford, it is not im-
possible. In fact, in a number of situations, random drug testing is
allowed. The Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Association98 faced the issue of drug testing in the federally
regulated railroad industry. The Court noted that individualized
suspicion, like probable cause, was not a "constitutional floor, below
which a search must be presumed unreasonable."'0 It then con-
cluded that the intrusion involved in urine testing was minimal 00
and that the government's interest in preventing the "hazardous
conduct" of operating under the influence would be jeopardized by
requiring a standard of individualized suspicion.101
In justifying its conclusion, the Court stated that the intrusiveness
of the testing procedure was reduced because employees were not
required to furnish samples under the direct observation of a moni-
tor. In fact, the samples were collected in an atmosphere akin to a
physical examination. Furthermore, the privacy expectations of the
employees were diminished by their participation in an industry
95. Id. at 331.
96. Id. (citation omitted). See also Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1436
(N.D. Il. 1987) ("[E]xceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are gen-
erally appropriate only where the privacy interests are 'minimaL' ").
97. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 510 N.E.2d at
330.
98. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
99. Id. at 1417.
100. Id. The testing involved in this case included not only urine tests, but also
breath tests. For the purposes of this Comment, only the urine tests are relevant, for
as the Court noted, breath tests are less intrusive than urine tests. Id. If, therefore,
the urine tests are reasonable, the breath tests are, by implication, also reasonable.
101. Id. at 1421.
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"regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in sub-
stantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees."102
In addition, the government's interest in testing without individu-
alized suspicion was "compelling" because the employees subject to
the tests "discharge[d] duties fraught with such risks of injury to
others that even a momentary lapse of attention [could] have disas-
trous consequences."10 3 The railroad employees could cause serious
injury to others before any signs of impairment became noticea-
ble. 0 4 Therefore, a requirement of individualized suspicion would
interfere with an employer's ability to locate drug use before a po-
tential tragic event. As a result, the absence of individualized suspi-
cion did not violate the employees' expectations of privacy.1°
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,100
a union of federal employees and a union official brought suit chal-
lenging the drug-testing program of the United States Customs Ser-
vice. The program required urine specimens of all employees apply-
ing for promotion to positions involving drug interdiction where the
employees had to carry firearms or handle classified material.10 7 The
tests were conducted in the absence of any degree of suspicion. In
addressing this issue, the Supreme Court stated that in certain lim-
ited circumstances, the government's need to discover latent condi-
tions or prevent their development was compelling enough to justify
intrusion absent individualized suspicion.10
The Court then applied this principle to the case at hand. It held
that the government's need to conduct suspicionless searches out-
weighed the privacy interests of the employees because the govern-
ment had a "compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdic-
tion personnel [were] physically fit, and [had] unimpeachable
integrity and judgment."11 9 Public interest also demanded effective
measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to firearm-carrying
positions.1 0 Furthermore, Customs Service employees had a dimin-
102. Id. at 1418. The Court, however, stated: "We do not suggest, of course, that
the interest in bodily security enjoyed by those employed in a regulated industry
must always be considered minimal. Here, however, the covered employees have long
been a principal focus of regulatory concern." Id. at 1418-19.
103. Id. at 1419.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1421.
106. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). Von Raab, like Skinner and Patchogue-Medford Con-
gress of Teachers, involved a union. Since the union's challenge to the drug-testing
program was constitutional in nature, the case is relevant for purposes of this Com-
ment. See supra notes 62 & 93.
107. Id. at 1388.
108. Id. at 1392.
109. Id. at 1393.
110. Id. The Court noted that a drug user's indifference to the Customs Service's
basic mission of drug interdiction, or his complicity with those importing drugs, could
"facilitate importation of sizable drug shipments or apprehension of dangerous
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ished expectation of privacy because they could expect an inquiry
into their physical fitness and condition."' In sum, the employees
were heavily regulated. Thus the tests were found reasonable under
the fourth amendment.11 2
In contrast to the federally regulated railroad industry in Skinner
and the federal regulation of Customs Service employees in Von
Raab, Shoemaker v. Handel115 involved the state-regulated horse
racing industry. Jockeys brought action challenging the New Jersey
State Racing Commission regulations providing for administration
of breath tests and random urinalysis.114 One of the claims was that
the tests violated the jockeys' fourth amendment rights.
In addressing the standard of individualized suspicion, the district
court found that the state had made a sufficient showing of the need
for conducting the test. First, the court recognized that the horse
racing industry was a unique class of industry subject to state regu-
lation. Second, the jockeys were licensed by the state and had re-
ceived notice of the implementation of these tests. Although notice
and licensure did not serve as a waiver of fourth amendment rights,
they were factors to be considered in balancing the jockeys' interests
with those of the state. Finally, the state had a vital interest in en-
suring that the horse racing industry was run honestly and safely
and that the public viewed the industry in this way.115 The court
also found that the jockeys were not subject to the unfettered dis-
cretion of those administering the tests because all names were se-
lected by drawing."1 Those administering the test could not inject
their prejudices into the selection process.
The jockeys' expectations of privacy were minimized by notice
and licensure, while the state had a compelling need to test for
drugs. In addition, those administering the tests did not have unlim-
ited discretion. As a result, the court found that the state's interest
outweighed the interests of the jockeys. The tests did not violate the
fourth amendment reasonableness standard.117
In sum, although drug testing constitutes a search and seizure
criminals." Id.
111. Id. at 1394.
112. Id. at 1396.
113. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), affl'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
114. For details of the breath and urine tests, see id. at 1093-95.
115. Id. at 1102.
116. Id. at 1103.
117. Id. at 1104. See also Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Washing-
ton, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (Random drug testing of police officers was found
constitutional because of intense governmental regulation of industry.); Rushton v.
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (Random drug testing of
nuclear power plant employees clearly falls within the Shoemaker exception to the
individualized suspicion standard.); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sun-"
line Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (Random drug testing of bus
drivers and maintenance workers is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.).
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, many of the tradi-
tional prerequisites have been abandoned. A warrant is not neces-
sary when testing employees for drugs. In addition, probable cause
has been largely replaced with the less stringent standard of reason-
able suspicion. When employees work in hazardous positions, how-
ever, even reasonable suspicion may not be necessary. Drug testing
is new to the concept of search and seizure and courts have applied
the fourth amendment in a realistic way rather than rigidly enforc-
ing the warrant and probable cause requirements.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW"18
The due process rights of federal employees are derived from the
fifth amendment, whereas the due process rights of state and local
government employees stem from the fourteenth amendment."0 The
right to procedural due process acts as "an institutional check on
arbitrary governmental action by imposing procedural limitations on
the government's power to deprive citizens of protected interests ." 20
As noted by the Supreme, Court in Board of Regents v. Roth,"1
"to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first
place, we must look . . . to the nature of the interest at stake. We
must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protection of liberty and property.1 22 The Court has made
clear that property interests protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment extend beyond ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. 12
Similarly, the Court has required due process protection of liberty
beyond the formal constraints of the criminal process. 1"' In sum, a
property interest in public employment may arise if there is an "ex-
pectation of tenure" in the position."25 In other words, there must be
118. Because an individual who is deprived of a liberty interest due to arbitrary
and capricious governmental actions may claim a denial of the right to substantive
due process, employees may resort to such a claim in the area of drug-testing. If the
drug-testing program is "so unreliable as to constitute arbitrary and capricious con-
duct," the employer has violated the right to substantive due process. See Survey,
supra note 3, at 607. This Comment, however, analyzes only procedural due process
because this claim is more frequently raised.
119. See Survey, supra note 3, at 594. The fifth amendment reads, in pertinent
part: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due
process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment states:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV sec. 1.
120. Survey, supra note 3, at 595.
121. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
122. Id. at 570-71 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 571-72.
124. Id.
125. See Comment, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes: Due Process Constraints on Dis-
charges of Public Employees Based on Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. Rv.
1623, 1636-37 (1987) [hereinafter, Comment, Due Process Constraints] (citing Board
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a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the job. 12 Furthermore, pub-
lic employees may claim a liberty interest in the position held. If a
termination decision is carried out in such a way as to damage the
employees' reputation, liberty interests are adversely affected and
the due process provisions apply.1 27
If employees legitimately claim a deprivation of property or lib-
erty interests in their employment, thus implicating the due process
clause, the next step is to determine what process is due. As the
Supreme Court noted in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermil, 128 "[a]n essential principle of due process is that a dep-
rivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and op-
portunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' ,120
Tenured employees have a right "to oral or written notice of the
charges against [them], an explanation of the employer's evidence,
and an opportunity to present [their] side of the story."1 0
The right to a hearing is granted in all cases. It does not depend
on a demonstration of success.13' This hearing, however, need not be
elaborate. The formality and procedural requirements may be differ-
ent in each case depending on the interests involved and the sub-
stance of subsequent proceedings."32 In Matthews v. Eldridge,'" the
Supreme Court outlined three factors to consider in determining the
process due to individuals in these hearings. First, the privacy inter-
ests that will be affected by the hearing must be identified. Second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of these interests under the pro-
cedures used, and the value of substitute procedures, must be deter-
mined. Third, the government's interest, including fiscal and admin-
istrative concerns that additional or substitute proceedings may
require, must be considered.13 4 Generally speaking, a full evidentiary
hearing is not required.3 5 In fact, the Supreme Court has had a ten-
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 403 U.S. 593,
599-601 (1972)).
126. See McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1985).
127. See Comment, Due Process Constraints, supra note 125, at 1639. "The Su-
preme Court has recognized that marking a citizen with a 'badge of infamy' infringes
her liberty and thus implicates the due process clause." Id. at 1638 (citing Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). The author also note3 that there may be
another constitutionally protected interest in employment. Depriving employees of
jobs impairs their ability to enjoy life, which implicates the "life" interest in the due
process clause. This position has not gained judicial acceptance. Id. at 1639.
128. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
129. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950)).
130. Id. at 546.
131. Id. at 544 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978)).
132. Id. at 545 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
134. Id. at 334-35.
135. Id. at 343.
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dency to find relatively minimal pretermination proceedings consti-
tutionally adequate."' 6
V. DRUG TESTING AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Property Interests
Although drug testing programs most frequently spawn fourth
amendment litigation, employees' rights to procedural due process
have also been raised in a number of cases. In Allen v. City of Mari-
etta,'27 the plaintiffs, employees of the Board of Lights and Water
and of the City of Marietta, were fired for smoking marijuana on the
job."3 " In addition to their fourth amendment claim, the employees
maintained that their rights to procedural due process had been vio-
lated. In analyzing the city's employment policies, the district court
held that the employees had property interests in their jobs. Hence,
they were entitled to due process before termination. In this case
due process mandated that the employees could only be discharged
for cause shown. 3 9
Although the employees were not given notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to their dismissal, they were given an adequate
post-termination proceeding, which, as the plaintiffs conceded,
cured any prior defect.140 The post-termination proceeding was
before the Pension Board of the Board of Lights and Water. Each
plaintiff was given a reason for dismissal (drug use on the job) and a
list of witnesses expected to testify at the hearing. The plaintiffs
also received a brief synopsis of the witnesses' expected testimony.
In addition, the plaintiffs' counsel was allowed to cross-examine wit-
nesses and produce witnesses who would testify in favor of the
plaintiffs.'4 ' The court found that the two essential elements of pro-
cedural due process, notice and an opportunity to be heard, were
satisfied. 4
2
In contrast to Allen, procedural protections were found to be com-
pletely lacking in Capua v. City of Plainfield. 14 The district court
136. Comment, Due Process Constraints, supra note 125, at 1641 (citing
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) and Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
137. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
138. For a detailed discussion of the facts of Allen and the employees' claim of a
fourth amendment violation through a warrantless search, see supra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text.
139. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. at 492-93.
140. Id. at 493-94.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 494. Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to exhaust their avenues of adminis-
trative review by not appealing to the Marietta City Council. Accordingly, the district
court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id.
143. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). For a detailed discussion of the facts of
Capua and a discussion of the reasonable expectation under the fourth amendment,
see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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found that the plaintiffs, city fire fighters, were "endowed with con-
stitutionally protected interests in their tenure pursuant to the New
Jersey statutory scheme governing municipal fire fighters."'" The
statutory scheme granted the plaintiffs a property interest in their
jobs.145
The court found that both the testing procedure and the proce-
dure for dismissal of employees were defective. The employees had
no notice of the testing procedure, no opportunity to voice objec-
tions in a hearing, and no chance to evaluate and review their test
results. Furthermore, the employer did not give employees who
tested positive written notice of the charges against them until after
their termination.1 4 6
B. Liberty Interests
As previously stated,47 termination of employees may violate pro-
tected liberty interests if, in conjunction with the dismissal, damage
is done to the individuals' reputations. The Supreme Court con-
fronted this issue in Paul v. Davis 4 5 where a photograph of the re-
spondent, along with his name, was included in a flier distributed to
local merchants in Louisville, Kentucky. The flier explicitly stated
that the photographs and names corresponded to "active shoplift-
ers" in the area. Although the respondent had been charged with
shoplifting, the charges were dismissed after the circulation of the
flier.149 The respondent brought suit against the Chief of Police
(who distributed the fliers) claiming a "violation of rights guaran-
teed.., by the Constitution of the United States." 50 Although the
district court found no such violation, the court of appeals reversed,
concluding that the respondent's claim alleged facts that constituted
a denial of due process. 15'
The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he words 'liberty' and 'prop-
erty' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single
out reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above
144. Id. at 1520.
145. Id. The district court also noted that the plaintiffs had a liberty and property
interest in their individual reputations, and in their honor and integrity. Id.
146. Id. at 1521. See also Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D).D.C.
1986) (denial of a hearing to a school bus attendant who was discharged for drug use
violated the constitutional right to procedural due process), rev'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Compare Shoemaker v. Han-
del, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1104-1105 (D.N.J. 1985), affd 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)
(procedure for the dismissal of jockeys who tested positive for drug use met all consti-
tutional and statutory safeguards inherent in procedural due process).
147. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
148. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
149. Id. at 695-96.
150. Id. at 696.
151. Id. at 697.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
other interests that may be protected by state law.15 2 Reputation
alone, therefore, was not sufficient to invoke the protection of the
due process clause without an "accompanying loss of government
employment." 153 Since the respondent could not claim a loss of em-
ployment, the interest asserted in his reputation was neither liberty
nor property under the fourteenth amendment.15' This was true re-
gardless of how seriously the circulating flier harmed his
reputation. 155
A similar issue was raised in Mosrie v. Barry.5 6 The case involved
a police officer's complaint that a transfer of employment, along
with public criticism of his previous job performance, damaged his
reputation, thus implicating his liberty interest under the due pro-
cess clause.1 57 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the harms suffered by the appellant did not satisfy the
requirements of Paul. In order for a claim of defamation to give rise
to a right to procedural due process, the court stated that there
must also be "a discharge from government employment or at least
a demotion in rank and pay."15 Since the appellant was simply
transferred, and not discharged, the court found that it would be
inconsistent with the Paul requirement of loss of employment to
find a deprivation of a liberty interest in this case. 5 9 Furthermore,
the court noted that the appellant not only retained his job, but also
his rank and pay. Although there was a loss of promotion potential
and job responsibility, the appellant had no legal claim to these be-
cause of the employer's broad discretion in employee transfers.100 As
a result, the appellant was not deprived of a liberty interest.
Although the claim of a deprivation of a liberty interest has not
received a great deal of attention in drug-testing cases, some courts
have addressed the issue. In Capua v. City of Plainfield,'2' the dis-
trict court found that city fire fighters, in addition to their property
interest in employment, also had a liberty interest in "their individ-
ual reputations, and in the honor and integrity of their good
152. Id. at 701.
153. Id. at 706.
154. Id. at 712.
155. Id.
156. 718 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
157. Id. at 1156-57. Although Mosrie also claimed a deprivation of a property in-
terest at the district court level, this issue was not before the District of Columbia
Circuit on appeal. Id. at 1157.
158. Id. at 1161.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1161-62.
161. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). For a detailed discussion of the facts of
Capua and an analysis of reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amend-
ment, see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Capua and
protected property interests, see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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names." '62 Thus, after the plaintiffs had been terminated for drug
use, their liberty interests could not be "arbitrarily or capriciously
infringed by government officials. 1 6 3 On the contrary, the dis-
charged employees were entitled to due process of law. In reaching
its conclusion, the district court cited Paul1" Although the court
did not explain how Capua satisfied the Paul requirements, a close
analysis of Capua reveals that there was at least potential harm to
the discharged employees' reputations when they were charged with
drug use. Furthermore, the potentially damaging information was
accompanied by loss of employment.
Similarly, in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,0 5 fire fighters
brought action seeking to enjoin the city's drug-testing policy. In ad-
dition to other constitutional claims, the plaintiffs argued that the
tests violated their rights under the fourteenth amendment.' 0 The
district court found that the plaintiffs had both a property interest
and a liberty interest which could not be taken without due pro-
cess.167 The liberty interest in Lovvorn, like that in Capua, was an
interest in "their reputation" or "integrity."'u6 Although Lovvorn
made no mention of the Paul case, it is clear that the fire fighters
had a liberty interest in their reputations and that a dismissal for
drug use would damage this reputation. Thus, under Paul, the due
process clause would be implicated. The court recognized that dis-
charged employees were entitled to due process, and held that the
procedures used by the city were appropriate.'0
C. Proposed Minimum Requirements for Procedural Due Process
When the due process clause is implicated, procedural require-
ments may vary from case to case depending on the facts and cir-
cumstances.Y70 When employers establish drug-testing programs,
however, they should comply with a number of minimum procedural
requirements. The end result of such compliance will benefit em-
ployers by reducing the likelihood of lawsuits, while at the same
time benefiting employees by protecting their rights under the four-
teenth amendment.
162. Id. at 1520.
163. Id. at 1520-21.
164. Id. at 1521.
165. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). For a detailed discussion of the facts of
Lovvorn and an analysis of individualized suspicion under the fourth amendment, see
supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
166. Id. at 877.
167. Id. at 883.
168. Id.
169. Id. For an analysis of a situation not involving drug testing where a depriva-
tion of a liberty interest in reputation was established, see Doe v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
170. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Since drug-testing methods tend to be inaccurate,1 1 employees
should be granted a hearing which allows for the presentation of evi-
dence on their behalf before termination. At the very least, employ-
ees should have the opportunity "to show the absence of on-the-job
impairment. ' 172 Furthermore, there is judicial support for requiring
employers to preserve the urine specimen for employees to have it
retested, if they so choose. 173 In addition to the opportunity to re-
test, employees should be given the chance to evaluate whether
proper laboratory techniques were used in testing the specimen.11'
The standard of proof at the hearing should be relatively high. "The
special nature of the government-individual relationship means that
the government must act with a higher degree of certainty. . . when
it deprives a citizen of a state-created interest."1' Although drug
testing is used to determine whether employees have used drugs in
the past, due process also requires a showing that employees will
continue to use drugs in the future, thus constituting a threat to the
employers' interests. 7 6 Proof of drug use may raise a presumption of
continued abuse. If so, employees should be given the opportunity to
rebut this presumption. 7 7
One technique which protects both the employers' interests in
having a productive work force and the employees' interests in con-
tinued employment is the use of employee assistance programs
(EAPs). Such programs provide employees with counseling and drug
rehabilitation opportunities. Instead of firing employees with drug
abuse problems, employees are required to seek therapy. After suc-
cessful completion of the program, employees are rehired and re-
sume their previous duties. In this way, employers retain exper-
ienced personnel and employees are not forced into
unemployment. 78 Although state legislation can make an EAP op-
tion mandatory, there appears to be no constitutional requirement
for establishing these programs. The due process clause requires
only notice and an opportunity to be heard.7 9 There is, however,
always the possibility that the Supreme Court, when presented with
such an issue, would opt for an expansive reading of the due process
171. See generally note 49 (The EMIT test tends to be inaccurate and should
always be confirmed by a second, more accurate GC/MS test.).
172. Comment, Due Process Constraints, supra note 125, at 1651. It is, however,
important to remember that a full evidentiary hearing is not required. See supra note
135 and accompanying text.
173. Id. (citing Banks v. FAA, 687 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1982)).
174. Id. at 1653. Such an evaluation can be made by inquiring into the testing
procedure through the cross-examination of the laboratory director.
175. Id. at 1651-52.
176. Id. at 1653.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1653-54.
179. Id. at 1654.
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clause, thus making the EAPs a requirement of due process.' 80
VI DRUG TESTING IN MAINE
A. State Constitutions and Statutes
This Comment, up to this point, has focused on the laws sur-
rounding drug testing of public employees, and, in limited circum-
stances, of private employees who are able to establish a "sufficient
nexus" between private employers and a governmental entity.181 Pri-
vate, nonunionized employees who are unable to establish the ap-
propriate nexus, however, constitute the majority of the national
workforce.'8 2 Since these employees do not enjoy the same protec-
tion as public employees under the Constitution of the United
States, they must look elsewhere for protection in challenging drug-
testing programs. One source of protection may be the constitution
of the state where the individual is employed. In order for the state
constitution to be of any help, however, it must apply to private, as
well as governmental, entities. Although ten state constitutions ex-
pressly provide for a right of privacy,183 only the Constitution of
California has been interpreted to protect individuals from both pri-
vate and governmental entities .'4 The Constitution of the State of
Maine, like the majority of other states, applies only to governmen-
tal entities. As stated in the preamble to the Maine Constitution:
"We the people of Maine. . .do agree to form ourselves into a free
and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine,
and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the gou-
ernment of the same."' 5 Private employees in Maine, therefore, are
unable to invoke the protection of the state constitution in challeng-
ing drug-testing programs.
Until recently, this meant that such employees had no recourse
whatsoever-they were forced to endure the drug-testing programs
of their employers. The Maine State Legislature, however, re-
sponded to the problem by drafting a number of bills designed to
prohibit drug testing altogether or to limit its applicabilitye'0 After
a long battle between the Legislature and the Governor, and be-
180. Id. Judging from the Supreme Court's past behavior, however, this seems
unlikely. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has had a tendency to find minimnl
pretermination proceedings constitutionally adequate. See id. at 1641.
181. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
182. Survey, supra note 3, at 650.
183. The ten states are: Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Washington,
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, and Montana. Id. at 651.
184. Id.
185. M& CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
186. Among the bills drafted were the following:. L.D. 105 (113th Legis. 1987);
L.D. 156 (113th Legis. 1987); L.D. 1400 (113th Legis. 1987); L). 1788 (113th Lebis
1987); LJD. 1870 (113th Legis. 1987); L.D. 1871 (113th Legia 1987); L.D. 2589 (113th
Legis. 1988); L.D. 537 (114th Legis. 1989).
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tween the legislative members themselves, a compromise was finally
reached. On July 1, 1989, Legislative Document (L.D.) 833,187 An
Act Relating to Drug Testing, was passed by both the Maine Senate
and House of Representatives.18 Six days later, the Governor signed
the bill into law. 1 9 The law, however, was subsequently amended by
L.D. 2049190 which was given gubernatorial approval on April 17,
1990. Since L.D. 2049 contained an "emergency clause" in its pre-
amble, the amendments took effect immediately upon approval. 19 1
The drug-testing statute fills the gap created by the Maine Con-
stitution-that is, it provides protection for private employees who
are subjected to drug testing programs. As noted in L.D. 833,
"[a]lthough recognizing that constitutional protections do not ex-
tend to the private sphere, it is manifest that all individuals retain
certain rights to their personal privacy which may not be infringed
upon without substantial justification."" 2 Since unrestricted work-
place drug-testing policies "pose grave risks of unduly infringing
upon the privacy rights of employees," the statute restricts the test-
ing procedures and requires the institution of specific program
guidelines.1 9 3 The statute attempts to accomplish this goal by re-
quiring, in part, that all employers who wish to establish a drug-
testing program develop a written policy providing, at a minimum,
for "[t]he procedure and consequences of an employee's voluntary
admission of a substance abuse problem and any available assis-
tance, including the availability and procedure of the employer's
employee assistance program."1 9 4 If substance abuse testing may oc-
187. L.D. 833 (114th Legis. 1989).
188. Legis. Rec. S-1393, H-1179 (1989). The Act was codified as Ms. Rsv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 681-90 (Supp. 1989-1990) (enacted by P.L. 1989, ch. 536, §§ 1-2).
189. It went into effect on January 1, 1990. See M. RE V. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
690(2), (Supp. 1989-1990).
190. L.D. 2049 (114th Legis. 1990).
191. These amendments were enacted by P.L.-1990, ch. 832, §§ 1-13. It should
also be noted that another minor amendment to the drug-testing statute (not dis-
cussed in the body of this Comment) was entitled "An Act to Amend the Implemen-
tation Date of the Drug Testing Laws" (P.L. 1990, ch. 604, §§ 1-3).
Acts of the Legislature normally do not become effective until 90 days after ad-
journment. An exception, however, applies in the case of "emergencies," where the
Act may become effective immediately upon approval.
192. L.D. 833, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989). It is, however, important to
note that the statute applies to public, as well as private, employees and employers.
"Employer" is defined as "any person, partnership, corporation, association or other
legal entity, public or private, that employs one or more employees." Ms. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 682(3) (Supp. 1989-1990) (emphasis added). "Employee" is defined as
"a person who is permitted, required or directed by any employer to engage in any
employment for consideration of direct gain or profit." Id. § 682(2) (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, the major reason for enacting the statute was to protect private
employees.
193. L.D. 833, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989).
194. Ms. Rsv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(A) (Supp. 1989-1990).
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cur, the written policy must describe which positions, if any, will be
subject to drug testing (including any positions subject to random
drug testing), the procedures for the collection and storage of sam-
ples, the chain of custody of the samples sufficient to prevent tam-
pering, the substances to be tested for, the cutoff levels for tests, the
consequences of a confirmed positive test result, the consequences of
a refusal to submit to testing, the opportunities for rehabilitation
following a confirmed positive result, a procedure to appeal and con-
test the accuracy of the tests, and any other matters required by
rules adopted by the Department of Labor.19 5
Each policy must be submitted to the Department of Labor for its
review.190 Where the policy does not comply with the statute, the
Department cannot approve it. The employer, however, will be noti-
fied of the defective areas and will be given a chance to rectify the
policy.117 If the employer makes the appropriate adjustments, ap-
proval will then be granted.
B. Imposition of Drug Testing
1. The Warrant Requirement?
Although one of the purposes of the Maine drug-testing statute is
to protect the privacy interests of employees from undue invasion,03
the statute does not require the employer to obtain a warrant prior
to testing applicants and employees for drugs. This policy is consis-
tent with the laws governing drug testing of public employees. The
purpose of the warrant requirement is to protect individuals against
the arbitrary acts of government agents and to ensure that any in-
trusion is necessary. In a situation where the testing procedures are
narrowly and specifically defined and standardized in nature, the
need for a warrant is drastically reduced.190
2. Probable Cause
The Maine statute allows for drug testing of both applicants and
employees. The testing of such individuals, however, is not left to
the discretion of the employers. 0 0 On the contrary, the statute
sharply limits the conditions under which testing may occur. With
respect to applicants, the statute provides that the employer "may
require, request or suggest" that an applicant undergo drug testing
only if the applicant has been offered a position with the employer
or has been offered a position on a roster of eligibility from which
195. Id. § 683(2)(B-L) (Supp. 1989-1990).
196. Id. § 683(2)(L).
197. Id. § 686(1).
198. Id. § 681(1)(A).
199. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1415 (1989);
supra text accompanying note 81.
200. See M& Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 681(2) (Supp. 1989-1990).
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employees will be chosen.20 1 In contrast to the drug testing of appli-
cants, employers may "require, request or suggest" that employees
submit to testing only if the employer has probable cause.2 2 The
determination of whether probable cause exists is to be made by su-
pervisory personnel, a licensed physician or nurse, or the employer's
security personnel.20 3 The person or persons making this determina-
tion must state, in writing, the facts upon which the determination
is made, and employees shall receive a copy of the statement. 0'
The employer is not required to have probable cause when testing
applicants for drugs. L.D. 833 hiotes that "[t]his was done to reflect
the fact that applicants are voluntarily seeking employment from an
employer with full knowledge that they may be subjected to a sub-
stance abuse test. '2 5 This position is in harmony with generally ac-
cepted fourth amendment principles. As one article states, "a rea-
sonably performed pre-employment drug test does not violate any
state or federal statute or any common law doctrine. 2 0 0 Since
Maine's statute prevents unnecessary "fishing expeditions" 207 by re-
quiring the employer to offer an employee a job or a position on a
roster of eligibility prior to drug testing, it provides the applicant
with more protection than is generally required.
Probable cause testing of employees, however, is not in harmony
with generally accepted principles of public employee drug testing.
As discussed earlier, 2 0 probable cause is not an "irreducible require-
201. Id. § 684(1). The number of persons on the roster cannot exceed the number
of applicants hired by the employer in the preceding six months. Furthermore, the
offer of employment or the offer of a position on the roster of eligibility may be con-
ditioned on the applicant receiving a negative test result. Id. § 684.
202. Id. § 684(2). Section 682(6) provides a definition for probable cause:
"Probable cause" means a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of
facts that induce a person to believe that an employee may be under the
influence of a substance of abuse, provided that the existence of probable
cause may not be based exclusively on any of the following:
A. Information received from an anonymous informant;
B. Any information tending to indicate that an employee may
have possessed or used a substance of abuse off duty, except when
the employee is observed possessing or ingesting any substance of
abuse either while on the employer's premises or in the proximity
of the employer's premises during or immediately before the em-
ployee's working hours; or
C. A single work-related accident.
Although probable cause drug testing is the general standard, it is important to
note that random drug testing is allowed under very limited circumstances. See id. §
684(3); infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
203. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(2)(A) (Supp. 1989-1990).
204. Id. § 684(2)(B).
205. L.D. 833, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989).
206. Development in the Law, supra note 15, at 599-600.
207. L.D. 833, Statement of Fact (114th Legis. 1989).
208. See notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
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ment of a valid search. ' 209 In fact, when the community's interest in
ensuring a drug-free workplace outweighs the individual's expecta-
tion of privacy, courts have consistently allowed drug testing pursu-
ant to a less stringent standard than probable cause, such as reason-
able or individualized suspicion.2 1 °
Maine's decision to require probable cause before drug testing
was, by no means, the result of oversight on the part of the Legisla-
ture. Probable cause was a compromise between two polarized
groups. One group favored a very stringent standard while the other
group believed that random testing was adequate. After proposing a
number of bills on the subject, the two groups ultimately agreed
upon the probable cause standard.2 1'
209. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
210. See, e.g., Lovvom v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E D. Tenn.
1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Turner v. Frater-
nal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985); Allen v. City of Mrietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). See also supra notes 84 and 91 for the definitions of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
211. One of the earliest bills on drug testing, L.D. 1400 (113th Legis. 1987), pro-
posed a very strict standard. Although the bill stated that the employer must have
probable cause to test the employees for drugs, it was the bill's requirements to estab-
lish probable cause that set it apart from the standard ultimately adopted. According
to LiD. 1400, supervisory personnel made the determination of probable cause in the
first instance. If the employee disputed the existence of probable cause, the urine
sample could be taken, but no test could be performed until after the existence of
probable cause was confirmed by a review panel The employee had the burden of
proving that probable cause did not exist. After the hearing, if the panel determined
that probable cause did not exist, the sample was to be disposed of without testing.
If, however, the determination of probable cause was upheld, testing would be con-
ducted. Id. § 1 (proposing Al. Rav. STAT. Am. tit 26, § 683(7)(A)(B) for enactment).
The effect of this provision was to grant the employee an appeal process before any
determination as to the presence or absence of drugs in the employee's urine sample
had been made. The supporters of probable cause, in the context of L.D. 1400, felt
that the standard ensured that "those who are breaking the law will have to face drug
testing." Legis. Rec. S-670 (1st Reg. Sess. 1987) (statement of Sen. Dutremble). The
standard did not single out innocent employees. The bill's opponents, however, be-
lieved that employees using drugs on the job were threatening the lives of their co-
workers, and that these coworkers "would gladly say, yes I will have the test, but
keep me safe from those who are abusing their rights." Id. S-505 (statement of Sen.
Sewall). As a result, the opponents believed that the right to randomly test for drugs
should be preserved. Some opponents, however, were only interested in random test-
ing in safety-sensitive positions. Nonetheless, these people still were opposed to prob-
able cause testing absent random testings in specified instances. Furthermore, Gover-
nor McKernan, in his letter to the Legislature vetoing the bill, stated that the bill was
"flawed in certain specific areas." Legis. Rec. S-646 (1987). One of the areas men-
tioned was that the bill set forth such complicated procedures for testing, laboratory
certification, rulemaking, and internal arbitration panels that the cost alone would
deter employers from instituting drug-testing programs altogether. Id. Although the
Governor did not specifically single out the probable cause review panel, such a panel
fell within the realm of "procedures for testing" and "arbitration panels" mentioned
in his letter. Governor McKernan's veto was sustained. Legis. Rec. S-672 (1987).
In L.D. 1870 (113th Legis. 1987), a bill subsequent to L.D. 1400, employers were
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3. Random Drug Testing
The issue of random drug testing inevitably arises whenever the
appropriate standard for drug testing is debated. In the public sec-
tor, random testing is allowed under limited circumstances.2 12 When
public employees work in closely regulated industries, their privacy
expectations are diminished. This, added to a compelling govern-
mental interest in testing for drugs, often influences the court's find-
ing that random searches are reasonable under the circumstances.213
Examples of closely regulated industries include the federally regu-
lated railroad industry,214 the horse racing industry,215 and the nu-
clear power industry.2 '6
Although the Maine drug-testing statute adopts probable cause as
the standard for testing employees, it also allows for random testing
under very limited circumstances. When the employee "works in a
position the nature of which would create an unreasonable threat to
the health or safety of the public or the employee's co-workers if the
employee were under the influence of a substance of abuse," random
testing is permitted.217 In addition, the statute expressly states that
the requirements of random testing must be construed narrowly.21 8
As a result, the Maine statute mirrors the law governing random
drug testing of public employees in that such testing is allowed only
not required to have probable cause prior to drug testing. The only limitation on the
employer was that testing had to be done in compliance with the employer's written
policy. Id. § 1 (proposing ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(2) for enactment). The
written policy was to be developed in consultation with the employees. Id., Statement
of Fact. Interestingly, the Senate's amendment to L.D. 1870 proposed a probable
cause standard very similar to the standard in the current statute. Sen. Amend. B to
L.D. 1870, No. S-226, § 2 (113th Legis. 1987) (proposing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
684(2) for enactment). The bill, however, was indefinitely postponed. Legis. Rec. H-
1185, S-1229 (1987).
The opposite poles represented by L.D. 1400 and L.D. 1870 ultimately resulted in a
compromise on the issue of probable cause. In L.D. 833, probable cause testing was
adopted, but the review procedure proposed in L.D. 1400 was excluded. L.D. 833, §
684(2) (114th Legis. 1989); Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(2) (Supp. 1989-1990).
Although clearly a less stringent standard than had originally been proposed, the
probable cause requirement adopted in Maine is more rigid than the standard ap-
plied by courts faced with federal constitutional challenges to drug testing. Since, at
the time of this Comment, there have been no cases involving the statute, it is diffi-
cult to predict how strictly the courts will apply the probable cause standard.
212. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
214. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
215. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), afl'd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
216. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
217. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(3)(B) (Supp. 1989-1990). Random testing is
also allowed when the employer and employee have bargained for such testing in a
collective bargaining agreement. Id. § 684(3)(A).
218. Id. § 684(3)(B). Until cases are generated in this area, it will be difficult to
predict just how narrowly the courts will interpret this section.
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in a limited number of cases.2" " The inclusion of random drug test-
ing in the statute, however, came about only after bitter struggle
and heated debate. A compromise was needed, and the end result
was limited use of random testing.220
In contrast to its heavy emphasis on individual privacy rights,
however, the Maine statute has relatively little to say concerning the
process due to employees terminated for drug use. According to the
statute, employers "may use a confirmed positive result.., as a
factor in" discharging employees, disciplining employees, or chang-
ing the employees' work assignments. 21 Before any such action may
be taken, however, employers must provide employees with an op-
portunity to participate in a rehabilitation program.2 22 Although the
statute does not specifically state that employees who are termi-
219. Although the state statute adopts the general philosophy of random testing
of public employees, it does have limitations. For example, the statute does not apply
to nuclear electrical generating facilities and their employees (including independent
contractors and employees of independent contractors who are working at the nuclear
plant). Furthermore, the statute does not apply to employees who are subject to sub.
stance abuse testing under any federal law or regulation or under rules of the Maine
Department of Public Safety that incorporate any federal laws or regulations relating
to drug testing for motor carriers. Id. § 681(8).
220. In L.D. 1400 (113th Legis. 1987) the employer was allowed to randomly test
only after an employee had received a confirmed positive result and if the employee
chose not to undergo rehabilitation. Although the employer could not randomly test
employees participating in a rehabilitation program, such testing could be conducted
by the treatment provider. Id. § 1 (proposing M. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 26, § 683(8) for
enactment). Many legislators, however, were opposed to such a limited approach to
random testing. Senator Donald Collins suggested that random testing should be al-
lowed for those employees working in safety-sensitive positions. Legis. Rec. S-501
(1987). This view was reiterated by Senator Thomas Perkins who stated that the so-
lution to drug testing boils down to either random testing in sensitive areas or proba-
ble cause testing. "[l]f you wait for probable cause it may be too late." Id. at S-508.
In vetoing the bill, Governor McKernan expressly stated that by requiring probable
cause testing of all employees, the bill failed "to recognize a difference between em-
ployees whose jobs affect directly the safety of fellow employees or the general public
and those employees who do not hold safety sensitive positions." Legis. Rec. S-646
(1987). Governor McKernan vetoed LID. 1788 (113th Legis. 1987) on the same
grounds. See Legis. Rec. H-1154 (1987).
Standing firm on their convictions, however, the opponents of random drug testing
introduced a subsequent bill which sought to prohibit random testing altogether. L.D.
1871 (113th Legis. 1987). The bill was to be submitted to the voters of Maine accord-
ing to a statutory referendum procedure. Id. § 2. Although the bill passed in both the
House and Senate, the Governor again exercised his veto power because, in his view,
"the nature of L.D. 1871 [made] it an inappropriate issue for the legislature to put
before the people of Maine in a referendum vote ... ." Legis. Rec. S-1346 (1987).
Recognizing Governor McKernan's ardent belief in random testing for safety-sensi-
tive positions, and his effective use of the veto, the opponents of random testing ulti-
mately admitted defeat. When L.D. 833 was introduced, it allowed for random testing
of employees in safety-sensitive positions. The random testing provisions became a
part of Maine's drug-testing statute, and they have not been modified or amended.
221. M& Rv. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 685(2)(A) (Supp. 1989-1990).
222. Id. § 685(2)(3).
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nated for drug use are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
heard, title 26, section 683 of the Maine Revised Statutes requires
that the employers' written policies set up "[a] procedure under
which an employee or applicant who receives a confirmed positive
result may appeal and contest the accuracy of that result. '22 3 In ad-
dition, another section of the statute provides that at the request of
employees or applicants, employers shall, at the time the urine sam-
ple is taken, segregate a portion of that sample for the employees' or
applicants' own testing.2 24 Although not stated in the language of
the statute, such a provision could only be useful to employees when
the accuracy of the test result is appealed.
The Maine statute tracks the law governing drug testing of public
employees in that the employees are entitled to procedural due pro-
cess prior to termination. The statute requires that the written pol-
icy include procedures to appeal and contest the accuracy of a re-
sult, and the policy must be provided to each employee.2 25
Nonetheless, the procedural guidelines are relatively scant. Since the
Department of Labor reviews each written policy and has the power
to accept or reject it,226 the determination of how complete a hearing
the employee will receive ultimately depends on the Department's
judgment. Until the Department has approved enough policies to es-
tablish a pattern of what procedure is required, it is impossible to
predict how close the procedure will be to that expected by courts
faced with a procedural due process challenge to a drug-testing
program. 2
27
VII. COMPARISON TO OTHER STATE STATUTES
Although the concept of drug testing in Maine is relatively new,
on a national scale it is not a novel idea. A number of states have
passed statutes within the last three years, including Connecticut,
Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont.22
223. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(K) (Supp. 1989-1990). This provision
remained unchanged throughout the numerous drug-testing bills proposed. See, e.g.,
L.D. 1400, § 1 (113th Legis. 1987) (proposing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(M)
for enactment); L.D. 1788, § 1 (113th Legis. 1987) (proposing Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 683(2)(L) for enactment); L.D. 1870, § 1 (113th Legis. 1987) (proposing ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(L) for enactment); L.D. 2589, § 1 (113th Legis. 1988)
(proposing ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(L) for enactment). There was, as a
result, no significant debate on procedural due process.
224. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(5)(A) (Supp. 1989-1990).
225. Id. § 683(3).
226. Id. § 686.
227. At the time this Comment was written, no program had been approved by
the Department of Labor.
228. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51t to 31-51aa (West Supp. 1990);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-.957 (West
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1 (Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1 to 34-38-15 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-
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The Minnesota and Vermont statutes, like Maine's drug-testing law,
apply to both public and private employers.220 On the other hand,
the statutes of Connecticut and Utah expressly exclude public em-
ployers. 230 The statutes of Iowa, Montana, and Rhode Island, how-
ever, do not include or exclude public employers. Iowa and Rhode
Island use the term "employer," without providing any definition.s
By the same token, Montana uses the words "person, firm, corpora-
tion, or other business entity or representative thereof" without fur-
ther clarification.2
32
Although Maine's drug-testing statute and the statutes of other
states differ in scope, none of the statutes require a warrant prior to
drug testing. The majority of these statutes do, however, require em-
ployers to provide all employees subject to drug testing with a copy
of the written policy outlining the drug-testing procedures.2-" As a
result, although employees do not have the protection of the warrant
requirement, they do have notice of "the place to be searched, and
the ... things [i.e. urine] to be seized."'234
Maine's probable cause requirement is more stringent than the
standard applied by courts faced with federal constitutional chal-
lenges to drug testing. Just as the Maine Legislature was divided
over the appropriate standard to apply, other states have had differ-
ing views. Both Iowa and Vermont require employers to have proba-
ble cause to believe that employees are using drugs on the job prior
to drug testing.235 In addition, although Rhode Island and Montana
520 (1987). See also Survey, supra note 3, at 654 & n.667.
229. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 682(3) (Supp. 1989-1990); MNN. STAT. AN. §
181.950(7) (West Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 511(6) (1987).
230. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51t(2) (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE Arm § 34-
38-2(3) (1988).
231. See, e.g., R.IL GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1(A) (Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN §
730.5(2) (West Supp. 1990).
232. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(1) (1989). This statute, however, may
imply that only private employers are included because the terms "person, firm, cor-
poration, or other business entity or representative" are usually associnted with the
private sector.
233. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.952(2) (West Supp. 1990) ("An employer
shall provide written notice of its drug and alcohol testing policy to all affected em-
ployees upon adoption of the policy .... "); MONT. CODE ANm § 39-2-304(2) (1989)
("Prior to the administration of a drug or alcohol test, the person, firm, corporation,
or other business entity or its representative shall adopt a written testing procedure
and make it available to all persons subject to testing."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-
7(1) (1988) ("Testing or retesting for the presence of drugs or alcohol by an employer
shall be carried out within the terms of a written policy which has been distributed to
employees and is available for review by prospective employees."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 514(2) (1987) ('"The employer shall provide all persons tested with a written
policy that identifies the circumstances under which persons may be required to sub-
mit to drug tests . .. ").
234. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
235. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3)(a) (West Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 21, §
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do not expressly require employers to have probable cause prior to
testing, these states have standards which approximate Maine's
probable cause standard. The Maine statute defines probable cause,
in relevant part, to mean "a reasonable ground for belief in the exis-
tence of facts that induce a person to believe that an employee may
be under the influence of a substance of abuse . . . .,,2" The Rhode
Island statute requires employers to have "reasonable grounds to
believe . . . that the employee's use of controlled substances is im-
pairing his or her ability to perform his or her job . . . ,,12, Simi-
larly, the Montana statute requires that employers have "reason to
believe that the employee's faculties are impaired. . . ."s The re-
maining states have less stringent requirements. Connecticut and
Minnesota have standards of "reasonable suspicion,' 2 3 9 while Utah
has no standard at all. Employers may test employees on any
basis.240
In contrast to the appropriate drug-testing standard, random drug
testing has produced more uniformity among the states. Montana,
Rhode Island, and Vermont prohibit random testing under all cir-
cumstances, except when such testing is mandated by federal law or
regulation.241 On the other hand, Connecticut and Minnesota pro-
hibit random testing generally, except when employees work in
safety-sensitive positions. 242 Iowa also goes beyond the Montana,
Rhode Island, and Vermont statutes by permitting pre-employment
random testing of correctional officers and by allowing such testing
in order to determine whether employees are eligible to receive
workers' compensation.2 3 The Maine statute is similar in nature to
the Connecticut and Minnesota statutes because it allows for ran-
dom testing when the employee's position "would create an unrea-
sonable threat to the health or safety of the public or the employee's
coworkers if the employee were under the influence of a substance of
abuse. 2 44 Only Utah permits random testing without limitation.2
513(c)(1) (1987). In contrast to the Maine statute, however, neither the Iowa nor Ver-
mont statute defines probable cause. For Maine's definition, see supra note 202.
236. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 682(6) (Supp. 1989-1990) (emphasis added).
See supra note 202.
237. RL. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(A) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
238. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(c) (1989) (emphasis added).
239. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-5Ix(a) (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
181.951(5) (West Supp. 1990). The Minnesota statute defines "reasonable suspicion"
as "a basis for forming a belief based on specific facts and rational inferences drawn
from those facts." Id. § 181.950(12).
240. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-3 (1988). See Survey, supra note 3, at 656.
241. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(c) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1(H) (Supp.
1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(b) (1987).
242. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51x(b) (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
181.951(4) (West Supp. 1990).
243. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(2) (West Supp. 1990).
244. Ma. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(3) (Supp. 1989-1990).
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In contrast to its emphasis on probable cause and random drug
testing, the Maine statute devotes much less energy to the require-
ments of procedural due process.2 6 Employees in Maine are given
the opportunity to appeal and contest the accuracy of the test re-
sults. 4 Like Maine's statute, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Is-
land, and Vermont statutes all provide the employee with some
form of appeal, but none of the statutes outline the minimum re-
quirements of procedural due process.2 4 8
VIII CRrricAL ANALYSIS OF THE MAINE DRUG TESTING STATUTE
Prior to the adoption of the Maine drug-testing statute, private
employers had broad discretion to institute drug-testing programs.
Private employees had no recourse to the federal or state constitu-
tions, because they protect only public employees. 20 They could
only challenge such programs on common law grounds.26 With the
adoption of the statute, employers' discretion was limited, thus pro-
tecting employees' privacy interests. For this reason, the statute is a
step in the right direction. A comparison of the Maine drug-testing
statute to the standards established by courts dealing with federal
constitutional challenges to drug testing and to the statutes of other
states, shows that some provisions of the Maine statute correctly
balance the employers' and employees' interests. Other provisions,
by contrast, go too far, and some do not go far enough.
The absence of a warrant requirement for the implementation of
245. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-3 (1988). This section provides that "[ilt is not un-
lawful for an employer to test employees or prospective employees for the presence of
drugs or alcohol... as a condition of hiring or continued employment." Since the
section provides no limitation on random testing, and since there is no limitation
found in any other provision, it is clear that random testing is permitted in Utah.
246. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
247. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(K) (Supp. 1989-1990).
248. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3)(e) (West Supp. 1990) ("An employee shall be ac-
corded a reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the results of a drug tesL');
MIN. STAT. ANN. § 181.952(5)-(6) (West Supp. 1990) (An employer's written policy
must include information concerning "the right of an employee or job applicant to
explain a positive test result on a confirmatory test... and any other appeal proce-
dures available."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(3) (1989) ("The person tested must
be given the opportunity to rebut or explain the results" of the drug tests.); RJ. Gu.
LAws § 28-6.5-1(F) (Supp. 1989) (The employer must provide the employee "with a
reasonable opportunity to rebut or explain the results."); VT. STAr. ANn. tit. 21, §
515(a) & (b) (1987) ("An employer shall provide an employee or applicant who has a
positive test result an informal meeting to explain the results ...... The employee
shall then be given the opportunity to test a portion of the original sample at an
independent laboratory.).
249. See supra text accompanying note 15.
250. Some of the more frequent common law challenges to drug testing prorams
include: wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Survey, supra
note 3, at 658.
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drug-testing programs in Maine is appropriate. As argued earlier,251
where testing procedures are narrowly defined and standardized in
nature, the need for a warrant is reduced because there is less op-
portunity for employers to act in an arbitrary manner. The drug-
testing procedures which must be followed in Maine are described at
length in the drug-testing statute.2 5 In addition to submitting the
mandatory written policy to the Department of Labor for approval,
employers must give employees a copy of the policy at least thirty
days before any portion of the written policy applicable to the em-
ployees takes effect. By the same token, if an employer wishes to
test an applicant for drug use, the employer must provide the appli-
cant with a copy of the policy before administering the test.208 The
statute also requires that drug testing be done "in a qualified testing
laboratory, '2 " with positive screening tests being followed by confir-
mation tests.255 The drug-testing report of the laboratory cannot dis-
close "the presence or absence of evidence of any physical or mental
condition" or of any substances other than the specific substances
employers requested to be identified.
256
Furthermore, if a warrant were required before employers could
test employees for drugs, it would "frustrate the purpose behind the
search"25 7 by causing delays. Such delays in the detection of drug
abuse may result in serious injury to the abusing parties or their
coworkers. Neither result is acceptable, and both stand as strong
support for the absence of a warrant requirement.
The statute's policy of allowing applicants to be tested for drugs
without any standard of proof258 correctly balances the privacy in-
terests of applicants with the interests of employers in having a safe
workplace and productive workforce. Applicants seek employment
251. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
252. Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683 (Supp. 1989-1990).
253. Id. § 683(3).
254. Id. § 683(6).
255. Id. § 683(7). A "screening test" is defined as "an initial substance abuse test
performed through the use of immunoassay technology, or a test technology of similar
or greater accuracy and reliability .. . which is used as a preliminary step in de-
tecting the presence of substances of abuse." Id. § 682(7)(A). A "confirmation test" is
"a 2nd substance abuse test, performed through the use of gas chromatography-mass
spectrometry, that is used to verify the presence of a substance of abuse ... " Id. §
682(7)(A)(B).
256. Id. § 683(8)(A)(4).
257. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US. 523, 533 (1967); note 70 and accom-
panying text (The warrant requirement can be dispensed with when "the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.").
258. The standardless drug testing of applicants should not be confused with the
drug testing of employees which, in Maine, requires a standard of probable cause.
Compare Mm. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(1)(A) & (B) (Supp. 1989-1990) with ME.
Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. 1989-1990).
[Vol. 43:129
DRUG TESTING
with full knowledge that they may be subjected to drug tests. If they
object to such testing as an invasion of privacy, they need only re-
frain from submitting an application with the particular employer
involved. If they decide to apply, their privacy interests are pro-
tected to the extent that no tests will be conducted until they have
been offered employment or a position on a roster of eligibility."" In
this way, employers are assured that the potential employee is drug-
free and applicants are not subjected to an involuntary invasion of
privacy.
Probable cause testing of employees, however, involves an overly
stringent standard. As stated by the Supreme Court, probable cause
is not an "irreducible requirement of a valid search. '210 In the public
sector, where the balancing of governmental and individual interests
suggests that the public interest will be best served by a standard
that falls short of probable cause, courts have responded by adopt-
ing a standard of reasonable or individualized suspicion.20 1 In the
private sector, the interests of private employers must be balanced
against the interests of private employees. Employers want a safe
workplace and productive workforce. Employee drug use on the job,
however, frustrates this interest. Drug use at work leads to billions
of dollars in lost productivity each year, and because the work po-
tential of employees under the influence of drugs is sharply re-
duced,262 shoddy workmanship and defective products are the
result. 63
Ultimately, the public as a whole suffers. It is the consumer who is
forced to endure poor service and low quality products. Such defec-
tive workmanship may also jeopardize the public's health and safety
since serious injury can be caused by malfunctioning consumer
products. Furthermore, losses incurred by businesses suffering from
low productivity will be passed on to the consumer through higher
prices. Thus a balancing of the need for a safe and productive work-
place with the privacy rights of employees suggests that the public
or societal interest will best be served by a standard lower than
probable cause. This standard is reasonable suspicion.
There is no reason why privacy rights of private employees should
be given greater protection than privacy rights of public employees
when both public and private employees work under similar circum-
stances. Public employees are forced to give up part of their privacy
259. MF. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(1)(A) & (B) (Supp. 1989-1990). See supra
note 201 and accompanying text.
260. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). See supra note 85 and ac-
companying text.
261. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. See supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
262. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
263. For a discussion of probable cause versus reasonable suspicion, see note 91.
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rights to advance the interests of the community. The same reason-
ing can be applied to private employees. The community has an in-
terest in a safe and productive private workforce. It is the duty of
each private employee not to jeopardize this interest. When the
community interest is balanced against the interest of the individual
private employee, the community's interest should prevail. There-
fore, drug testing should be allowed on the basis of reasonable suspi-
cion. Both Connecticut and Minnesota have adopted this stan-
dard.2 ' The Maine Legislature should be encouraged to follow their
lead.
A standard such as reasonable suspicion would allow the employer
to test the employee for drugs before drug use on the job reaches its
acute stages. In sum, "if you wait for probable cause it may be too
late."26 5 This, however, is not to say that employees completely sur-
render their privacy rights when they enter the work force. By re-
quiring a standard of reasonable suspicion, employers are not given
unbridled discretion to test employees for drugs. On the contrary,
"some quantum of individualized suspicion ' '2 6 is required before a
test can be administered.
Random drug testing is, of course, the exception to the probable
cause requirement in Maine. Where employees work in positions in
which drug use would create an unreasonable risk to the health and
safety of the public (or to the employees' coworkers) random testing
is allowed. 287 Although this provision created a firestorm of de-
bate, 2 68 its inclusion in the statute is appropriate. In situations
where there is unreasonable risk, a momentary lapse of attention
can lead to disaster. Since.damage may occur before any signs of
drug use manifest themselves, reasonable suspicion would not be an
effective tool. The privacy interests of individuals are outweighed by
the need to protect the health and safety of the public and to ensure
that there is a safe environment in which to work.269 Random testing
264. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51x(a) (West Supp. 1990); INN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.951(5) (West Supp. 1990).
265. Legis. Rec. S-506 (1987) (statement of Sen. Perkins), supra note 220. For a
definition of probable cause, see supra note 84. For a definition of reasonable suspi-
cion, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
266. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). If,
however, the risk to the public becomes "unreasonable," random drug testing should
be allowed. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
267. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(3)(B) (Supp. 1989).
268. See supra note 220.
269. This aspect of Maine's drug-testing statute is consistent with the standards
established by courts faced with federal constitutional challenges. See supra notes 98-
117 and accompanying text. It is also consistent with the statutes of Connecticut and
Minnesota. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
Montana, Rhode Island, and Vermont prohibit random testing under all circum-
stances, except when such testing is mandated by federal law or regulation. See supra
note 241 and accompanying text. When the interests of society are weighed against
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should not, however, be used as a means to avoid the standard of
reasonable suspicion. If the risk is not unreasonable, the privacy in-
terests of employees should outweigh the interests of employers and
the public, and the standard of reasonable suspicion should be
employed.27
0
Although the provisions of the Maine statute make an admirable
attempt to protect the private employee from unreasonable drug
tests, they provide much less guidance on the issue of procedural
due process. Employers' written policies must contain a procedure
by which employees and applicants can appeal and contest the accu-
racy of results.271 This policy, in turn, is subject to review by the
Department of Labor.272 One specific requirement, however, is that
employees must be able to have a urine sample tested indepen-
dently.2 7 3 Such evidence can then be used to appeal and contest the
accuracy of test results. In addition, the statute requires that all em-
ployers with over twenty full-time employees have a functioning em-
ployee assistance program to provide an opportunity for rehabilita-
tion to employees with drug problems.27 4' Employees may not be
dismissed after having received a confirmed positive test result un-
less an opportunity to attend such a program has been refused.27
Beyond this, however, the statute offers little guidance. It contains
no mention of the formalities of the procedures due. There is no
indication of whether a full evidentiary hearing is required, and
there is no provision for the testimony and cross-examination of
witnesses.
the privacy interests of individuals, however, the decision to allow random testing
under limited circumstances in Maine is valid and well reasoned.
270. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
271. MF. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(2)(K) (Supp. 1989-1990).
272. Id. § 686.
273. Id. § 683(5). This requirement has been proposed by at least one commenta-
tor as one of the minimum requirements for procedural due proces See Comment,
Due Process Constraints, supra note 125, at 1651 (citing Banks v. FAA, 687 F.2d 92,
95 (5th Cir. 1982)).
274. MF. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 683(1) (Supp. 1989-1990). Some commentators
have suggested that employee assistance programs should be a requirement of proce-
dural due process. See, e.g., Comment, Due Process Constraints, supra note 125, at
1654.
275. MF Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 685(2)(B) & (C) (Supp. 1989-1990). If employ-
ees choose to participate in rehabilitation programs, there are two options. First, if
employers have a program which offers counseling or rehabilitation therapy, employ-
ees may choose to enter the program at the employers' expense. If, however, the em-
ployers' programs do not offer such services, employees may choose to participate in a
public or private rehabilitation program, in which case the expenses shall be divided
between employers and employees if employers have more than twenty full.time
workers. If the costs are covered by a group health insurance plan, the insurance shall
cover the costs. Except to the extent that the expenses are covered by insurance,
employers with fewer than twenty full-time employees are not responsible for any
costs of rehabilitation under any public or private programs. Id. § 685(2)(C)(1)(a)(b).
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Until the Department reviews enough policies to establish how le-
nient or strict procedures should be, employers are left with no indi-
cation of what procedural foundation their policies should have.270
Employers will be encouraged to implement the least expensive and
most informal proceedings available in hopes that the Department
will approve the policy without greater procedural requirements. If
this occurs, the employee will be at a disadvantage. Having been ac-
cused of drug use on the job, the opportunity to contest the results
will be limited. If the Department does not accept such policies, it
will lead to frustration and delay as policies are written, submitted,
and rejected. Thus the statute should at least provide some basic
guidelines that explain the minimum procedural due process re-
quirements for hearings.
The minimum requirements for appealing and contesting the ac-
curacy of drug test results should include a hearing where evidence
can be presented on employees' behalf.2 7 Employees should be
given the opportunity to show the absence of on-the-job impair-
ment. Witnesses should be allowed to testify for the employees, and
the employees should be allowed to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.278 In addition, those who requested that a portion of the
urine sample be set aside for independent testing should have the
chance to introduce the independent test results at the hearing. The
hearing should also establish whether the laboratory techniques
used in testing the urine sample were adequate. This can be accom-
plished by allowing employees (preferably through counsel) to ques-
tion laboratory directors on testing procedures and to compare such
testimony with the views of experts in the field. In this way, employ-
ees are given the "opportunity to present [their] side of the
story. 279
The determination of employee drug use should be made by a
neutral panel selected by the particular employers and employees
276. The Department of Labor has outlined the requirements for the written sub-
stance abuse policies of employers, but it has not expanded on the statutory mandate
of a procedure to appeal and contest the accuracy of test results. See Maine Dep't of
Labor-Bureau of Labor Standards: Rules Relating to Substance Abuse Testing §
3(A)(4)(d)(vii) (1989).
277. As stated earlier, the formality and procedural requirements may be different
in each case depending on the interests involved. See supra note 132 and accompany-
ing text. Since the interests that employees have in their employment are the basis of
their livelihood, the procedural suggestions made in the accompanying text are the
bare minimum below which employers cannot go. More formal and elaborate proce-
dures, however, may be instituted by employers.
278. At all stages of the hearing, employees should be allowed to have lawyers
present to ensure that rights are protected. The cost of having an attorney should be
borne by the employees. If employers were required to pay for the entire cost of the
hearing, it is doubtful whether any employer would institute a drug-testing program.
The costs of having a program would outweigh any benefit derived from it.
279. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
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involved.28 0 If employees are found to have used drugs on the job,
the statutory policy of giving employees the option of attending an
employee assistance program should be retained. This will benefit
employees by allowing for rehabilitation and a return to work as
soon as possible. It will also benefit employers who will not have to
hire and retrain permanent replacements each time an employee is
found to have used drugs on the job. If the employees refuse to at-
tend a rehabilitation program, employers should be allowed to fire
the uncooperative parties.
If these procedural requirements were added to the Maine drug-
testing statute, it would be the most comprehensive state drug-test-
ing statute with respect to procedural guarantees. Although other
states which have adopted drug-testing statutes also include the
right to an appeal, none of them clearly outlines what process is
due.2 " Maine would be a pioneer in this field. If, however, the Legis-
lature was serious about protecting the privacy interests of employ-
ees when it adopted the statute, it should also be serious about pro-
viding minimum procedural guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Drug testing of employees in the nonunionized workplace is a con-
troversial topic because it involves a balancing of interests between
employers, employees, and the general public. Employers and the
public at large are interested in a safe workplace and maximum pro-
ductivity. Employees, on the other hand, are more concerned with
their privacy rights and expectations. In attempting to balance the
scales, due regard must be given to the interests of each party. Thus
a compromise is necessary. In the public sector, this has meant that
drug testing may be conducted with a standard that falls short of
probable cause without violating the constitutional rights of employ-
ees. In fact, if the government's interest is compelling, random test-
ing may be allowed. In all cases, such testing requires that employ-
ees testing positive for drugs be given notice and an opportunity to
be heard before termination. Since the constitutional protections do
not extend to private employees, in most cases the only recourse is
280. Perhaps a panel of three or five could be adopted with the employers and
employees involved each choosing one of the three or two of the five members of the
panel The remaining member could then be chosen from a list of candidates agreed
upon by the employers and employees. The problem of having these formalities is the
expense of the procedure. Many smaller employers would not have the money to fi-
nance such a hearing. As a result, they would probably refrain from instituting drug-
testing programs. If, however, procedures are to be consistent for all employees, hear-
ings should be allowed in all cases. To accommodate smaller employers, the size of
the panel could be reduced to one or two managers or supervisors of the business
(who have been agreed upon by the employers and employees). The details of the
hearing for smaller employers would have to be hammered out in the legislature.
281. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
to state statutes. Prior to the adoption of the Maine drug-testing
statute, employees futilely argued that their privacy rights were be-
ing trampled upon by the implementation of workplace substance
abuse testing. With no statutory restrictions, the employers clearly
had the upper hand in implementing such policies.
With the adoption of the Maine statute, however, the Maine Leg-
islature sought to protect the privacy rights of both public and pri-
vate employees. In a sense, the statute is an attempt to extend the
constitutional protections enjoyed by public employees to employees
in the private sector. As a result, the decisions of courts faced with
constitutional challenges to drug testing should have been used as
guidelines in drafting the statute. In analyzing the statute, however,
a number of important variations are evident. On the one hand, re-
quiring employers to have probable cause, as opposed to reasonable
or individualized suspicion, prior to drug testing frustrates their in-
terest in having a safe and productive workplace because employees
under the influence of drugs can do a great deal of damage prior to
establishment of probable cause. On the other hand, by failing to
outline the requirements for procedural due process, the statute
leaves the determination of procedural requirements to the Depart-
ment of Labor. Thus the policy will be developed in an ad hoc fash-
ion as the Department accepts or rejects written proposals. This will
encourage employers to institute the most inexpensive and informal
proceedings possible in hopes that the policy will receive approval
despite its cursory treatment of procedural due process. This, in
turn, may lead to delay as the Department rejects the proposals and
the employers are required to resubmit them. Although the statute
is a step in the right direction, further revision is necessary before
an equitable solution to the drug testing problem is developed.
Shawn K. Bell
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